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THIS BUSINESS OF “PROCURING CAUSE” IN VIRGINIA
ROBERT LUTHER III*
ABSTRACT
This Article aims to provide a basic overview of Virginia law resulting
from suits for sales commissions, with a special emphasis on “procuring
cause” case law. By thinking ahead to the kinds of issues that have resulted in the recovery or failure of sales commissions by agents in past
sales commission cases, real estate litigators will be in a better position to
advise their clients. To that end, this Article further seeks to serve as a
brief, yet stout, reference resource for real estate litigators and members
of the Virginia bench confronted with facts directed towards this often
nuanced area of Virginia law.

*

Mr. Luther’s practice is based in Williamsburg, Virginia, and emphasizes business,
civil, real estate, and constitutional litigation. Please note that the opinions expressed in
this Article are exclusively those of the author and do not constitute legal advice, nor
does the receipt or review of the information contained herein establish an attorney-client
relationship. Comments are graciously received at http://www.RobLuther.com.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been the practice in the United States for judges to decide
questions of law and juries to decide questions of fact.1 Put simply, whereas “[i]t is the duty of the court to construe a deed, or contract,”2 it is the
duty of juries to consider testimony and determine factual matters such as
whether “the light was green” when the two cars collided.3 Unfortunately,
the reality is that trial court practice is often not particularly tidy; most
cases involve mixed questions of law and fact. Legendary evidence Professor James Bradley Thayer has even gone so far as to say that “[a]ll
questions of fact ... are mixed questions of law and fact.”4 Given these
semantics, perhaps distinction by analogy is helpful here. It has been suggested in modern legal scholarship that, “the most frequently given example of a mixed question of law and fact is the question of whether a person
is ‘negligent.’”5 Although “negligence” is a word of common definition, in
the law it has a specific definition realized upon the application of facts as
found by a jury to the legal standard of duty, breach, causation and damages.6
Akin to negligence, Virginia law has its own specific definition for the
occasion when an agent7 is entitled to a commission for his or her market1

George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 14
(1992).
2
Realty Co. of Va. v. Burcum, 106 S.E. 375, 376 (Va. 1921) (asserting that it is the
role of the Court and not the jury to decide questions of law, which include “the legal
effect of a deed or contract”).
3
See generally id.
4
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 224–25 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969).
5
Christie, supra note 1, at 14.
6
See 13 PETER NASH SWISHER, ROBERT E. DRAIM & DAVID D. HUDGINS, VIRGINIA
PRACTICE SERIES: TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 3:1 n.25 (Thomson Reuters/West,
2011 ed.) (citing WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 164–68 (West 5th ed. 1984) and DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269–73
(West 2000)); see also McGuire v. Hodges, 639 S.E.2d 284, 288 (Va. 2007) (“To establish negligence sufficient to sustain a judgment against Mrs. Hodges, McGuire was
required ‘to show the existence of a legal duty, a breach of the duty, and proximate causation resulting in damage.’”) (citations omitted).
7
The cases have not spilt much ink distinguishing between agents, brokers, and realtors in the context of commission litigation. That said, as a general proposition, any of
these three classes of individuals who are authorized to and enter an agency relationship
to facilitate the sale of real estate would seem to have these cases at his or her disposal,
subject to express prohibitions to the contrary, ethics codes (where applicable), and
defenses raised by counsel in litigation suggesting reasons why they should not apply.
Most frequently, cases involve an individual seeking to recover a commission from a
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ing efforts. That phrase is “procuring cause.”8 Like “negligence,” the
“procuring cause” of a real estate transaction has typically been determined at trial by a jury’s application of facts to the legal standard instructed, unless the parties agree otherwise.9 Yet there is some question as
to whether these “procuring cause” cases have produced a unified body of
law. The Supreme Court of Virginia has paid special note to this difficulty
and suggested that:
It is impossible to reconcile either the expressions of the courts or the
various cases involving the commissions of real estate brokers, and it
would be a thankless and unprofitable task to review [even] a limited
number of the cases. There are, however, certain fundamental rules
which are everywhere recognized, even if it may appear that they have
not always been observed.10

This Article accepts the Leicht-Benson Realty court’s outstanding invitation for clarification, and aims to provide a basic overview of those
“fundamental rules which are everywhere recognized,”11 and which comprise the basics of Virginia’s body of “procuring cause” case law. By
thinking ahead to the kinds of issues that have resulted in the recovery or
failure of sales commissions by agents in past sales commission cases, real
estate litigators will be in better positions to advise their clients. To that
end, this Article further seeks to serve as a brief, yet stout, reference resource for real estate litigators and members of the Virginia bench confronted with facts directed towards this often nuanced area of Virginia
law.

successful seller. Less frequently, cases involve real estate entities seeking to recover
commissions believed to be owed by successful sellers or purchasers for the listing entities’ role in the resulting sale. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Coldwell Banker, 377 S.E.2d 443,
445 (Va. 1989); R.A. Poff & Co. v. Ottaway, 62 S.E.2d 865, 866 (Va. 1951); Wilson v.
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 738 (Va. 1945); Realty Co. of Va. v. Burcum,
106 S.E. 375, 376 (Va. 1921).
8
Edmonds, 377 S.E.2d at 445.
9
See, e.g., Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 261 (Va. 1948); Edwards v. Cragg, 50
S.E.2d 281, 281 (Va. 1948); Richeson v. Wilson, 47 S.E.2d 393, 394 (Va. 1948); Long v.
Flory & Garber, 72 S.E. 723, 723 (Va. 1911) (cases where parties agreed to try commission cases by judge alone).
10
Leicht-Benson Realty & Constr. Corp. v. J. D. Stone & Co., 121 S.E. 883, 884 (Va.
1924).
11
Id.
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I. THE NATURE OF A LISTING AGREEMENT IN MODERN REAL ESTATE
PRACTICE
Real estate listing agreements are not entirely unlike standard form
contracts; consequently, the requirements for valid enforcement are similar.12 Though Virginia realtors in 2012 primarily use the Virginia Association of Realtors Exclusive Authorization to Sell (closed listing) form when
engaging a hopeful seller, nothing precludes a court from enforcing or
declining to enforce unique listing agreements prepared by realtors on
case-by-case bases, presuming they comply with standard contract law
requirements and are otherwise duly executed.13
Assuming the listing agreement is duly executed, and litigation subsequently commences, a court charged with reviewing the listing agreement
will start its analysis the same way it would consider any other contract:
by first asking whether it is enforceable as it is written within its four corners.14 In Virginia, listing agreements are most likely to be unenforceable
when: (1) they contain no termination language, and (2) a sale is consummated after the ninety-day window from the date on which the realtor’s
services were secured.15 This is the case because the Virginia Code (the
Code) requires that such agreements include a date16 or event17 upon

12

See generally Price v. Francis, 35 S.E.2d 823, 825–26 (Va. 1945).
Obviously, when circumstances arise where it is appropriate for a realtor to go
beyond the Virginia Association of Realtors Exclusive Authorization to Sell (closed
listing) form and prepare a unique listing agreement, the prudent course for both the
realtor and hopeful seller would be to have counsel review the form of listing agreement
prior to its execution.
14
See Price, 35 S.E.2d at 825.
15
See Bryant Real Estate, Inc. v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 106 F. App’x. 182, 185 (4th Cir.
2004) (applying the Virginia Code Section 54.1-2137(B) in a situation where brokerplaintiffs failed to discuss or memorialize in the form of agreement any language concerning a termination date whereby their brokerage services to Toll would terminate).
16
See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2137(B) (2011) (“Brokerage agreements shall be in
writing and shall: 1. Have a definite termination date; however, if a brokerage relationship does not specify a definite termination date, the brokerage relationship shall terminate 90 days after the date of the brokerage agreement”).
17
See Piedmont Assoc., Inc. v. Little, 49 Va. Cir. 488, 490 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999) (rejecting the argument that a specifically fixed “date” was necessary). In Piedmont, the court
concluded that the statute meant that a definitive “event” upon which termination would
occur satisfied the statutory requirement of a definite termination date. Id. It said:
13
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which the agreement is set to terminate. It is uncomfortably easy to see
how this situation may arise, because an agent may quite reasonably continue to market an unsold property beyond the explicit three-month window of protection provided under the Code.18 Absent a contract to the
contrary, if successful in securing a sale but denied a commission by the
seller, the agent will be left only with a remedy in quantum meruit.19
II. WHEN IS A COMMISSION DUE?
In Virginia, an agent is due a commission “when he produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms authorized by or accept-

The Court having examined the structure of §54.1-2137 is convinced
that the legislature did not intend or mean this statute to require that
every brokerage contract have a date certain (i.e., a month, day, and
year) on which it terminates but that a brokerage contract needs to have
only a stated date or the occurrence of a specified event from which a
fact finder can reasonably determine if contractual obligations have
been timely fulfilled.
Id. The court further noted that, “[b]y that language, the legislature clearly appears to
have contemplated that parties can enter into brokerage contracts which have as their
termination point the occurrence of a certain event or events.” Id.
18
However, a listing agreement that defines its term as “month-to-month” should not
be held unenforceable for lack of a definite termination date. The meaning of the term
“month” is definite as a matter of law, and is not cause for a court to render said agreement unenforceable. The Virginia Code specifically defines “month” to be “a calendar
month.” VA. CODE ANN. § 1-223 (2008). Moreover, the frequent use of “month-tomonth” terminology in landlord-tenant, employment, and other commercial endeavors
makes clear that “month” is a calendar month, subject to termination in the event the
property is sold or upon notice by the other party. See, e.g., Sentara Enters., Inc. v. CCP
Assocs., 413 S.E.2d 595, 596 (Va. 1992) (landlord-tenant); Title Ins. Co. of Richmond v.
Howell, 164 S.E. 387, 389 (Va. 1932) (employment); SoftPros, Inc. v. Privacy Vaults
Online, Inc., 78 Va. Cir. 323, 326 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009) (software services contract); see
also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-223, 55-248.7 (2007) (month-to-month).
19
See Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 869 (Va. 1950); Va. Bus. Exch., Inc. v. Mathews, 38 Va. Cir. 370, 371 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (“With regard to whether plaintiff was the
procuring cause of the sale, plaintiff relies on well-settled Virginia law that even in the
absence of an express contract, where a broker ‘perform[s] services which [are] the
procuring cause of the sale and under such circumstances as to give the owner reason to
believe they [are] performed with the expectation of compensation,’ the broker may
recover a reasonable commission under the doctrine of implied contract.”) (citing Korzendorfer Realty v. Hawkes, 178 S.E.2d 524, 526 (Va. 1971)); see also Wilson v.
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Va. 1945) (“Of course, the broker’s right to
commissions must be based on a valid contract, express or implied”); Shea Realty Corp.
v. Page, 69 S.E. 327, 328 (Va. 1910) (all cases recognizing an implied contract to pay
commission if broker is determined to be the “procuring cause” of sale).
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able to the seller.”20 Naturally, the follow-up question asks whether the
contract must close as a prerequisite for the agent’s entitlement to a commission. The Supreme Court of Virginia considered this question in Kuga
v. Chang.21 In Kuga, Chang was a broker acting on behalf of the Kugas.22
The listing agreement entitled Chang to a six percent commission.23
Chang procured the signature of Rainwater on a contract for the purchase
of the Kugas’ home.24 Rainwater backed out of closing, and a number of
suits against the parties ensued, including a suit by Chang against the
Kugas for her commission under the listing agreement as modified by the
sales contract.25 The circuit court ruled for Chang and the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed.26 The court held that a broker is entitled to a commission from the owner when the broker produces a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy the property on the owner’s terms, regardless of
whether the sale is ultimately consummated.27
So when, as a matter of law, is a prospective purchaser “ready, willing
and able to buy the property?”28 Virginia law requires neither that an agent
generate a contract of sale,29 nor that the sale be otherwise consummated,30 unless a specific condition precedent in the contract between the
20

See VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL, Jury Instr. No. 43.000 (Repl. Vol.
2011) [hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
21
Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 817 (Va. 1991).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 818.
26
Id. at 819.
27
See Kuga, 399 S.E.2d at 819; see also Kingsland Land Corp. v. Lange, 160 S.E.2d
872, 874 (Va. 1950) (announcing, for the first time in Virginia, the rule that the “right to
a commission will not be defeated by the failure or financial inability of the purchaser to
perform.”).
28
See JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, No. 43.050 (“A purchaser is ready, willing
and able to buy if he wants to buy and if at the time he is produced to the seller he has the
ability to obtain any necessary financing at the closing”).
29
See, e.g., Richeson v. Wilson, 47 S.E.2d 393, 396 (Va. 1948) (“[U]nless his agreement with the owner so provides, the broker is not required to procure a written contract
signed by the purchaser as a condition precedent to his right to recover commissions.”);
Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 263 (Va. 1948) (same); Low Moor Iron Co. of Va. v.
Jackson, 84 S.E. 100, 102–03 (Va. 1915) (affirming jury verdict for broker and holding
that, unless stated otherwise, a broker is not required to procure a written contract signed
by purchaser as condition precedent for right to recover commission for producing ready,
willing, and able buyer).
30
See, e.g., Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263 (stating that a broker’s right to recover commission is not dependent upon consummation of sale); Massie v. Firmstone, 114 S.E. 652,
653 (Va. 1922) (same).
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broker and seller calls for as much.31 As described supra,32 the law of
“procuring cause” with respect to broker commissions in Virginia has
never been, and is not now, that formalistic or narrow.33 However, simply
because an agent need not produce a contract of sale to be entitled to a
commission, this is not to say that failure to have a valid listing agreement
outstanding with the seller upon the property’s sale entitles the agent to a
commission.34
III. PROCURING CAUSE: A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY
Let us back up a moment to the court’s statement in Kuga that a broker
or agent must produce a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the
property on the owner’s terms, regardless of whether the sale is ultimately
consummated.35 What does the court mean by “produce?”36 Essentially,
the court means that the broker or agent must be the “procuring cause” of
the sale, but with one caveat.37 The Supreme Court of Virginia has suggested that it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of “procuring
cause” without first producing a ready, willing, and able buyer.38 The
production of a “ready, willing, and able” purchaser is the foundation
upon which the attempt to prove “procuring cause” will be built. At this
point, it is helpful to consult the “procuring cause” jury instruction. In a
“procuring cause” controversy, the standard the facts must meet in order to

31

See, e.g., Richeson, 47 S.E.2d at 397 (“[T]he payment of the commission was stipulated to be conditioned upon the consummation of the particular sale, at the particular
price and within a specified time.”); Long v. Flory & Garber, 72 S.E. 723, 723–24 (Va.
1911) (“[T]he right of the plaintiffs[’] [brokers] to demand commissions was predicated
upon the consummation by them of a sale at the price named.”) (emphasis added) (denying plaintiff’s commission when property sold for less than the amount required under the
broker-seller arrangement).
32
See supra notes 17–18.
33
See Richeson, 47 S.E.2d at 396; Massie, 114 S.E. at 653; Low Moor Iron Co., 84
S.E. at 102–03; infra notes 35–39.
34
See supra notes 16–18; infra text accompanying notes 125–29.
35
Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 818 (Va. 1991).
36
Id. at 819.
37
Edmonds v. Coldwell Banker, 377 S.E.2d 443, 445–46 (Va. 1989).
38
See id. at 445. Edmonds reversed the trial court, which found that the brokerage
“had not produced a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the [sellers’] terms
during the listing period,” but that the brokerage “could recover its commission because it
was the procuring cause of the sale.” Id. (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the court
asserted that the brokerage could not be the “procuring cause” where it did not “arrange[]
the terms which produced a purchaser ‘ready, willing, and able to buy.’” Id. at 446.
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establish or refute liability against the seller is articulated in Virginia
Model Jury Instruction No. 43.020, which provides as follows:
To earn his commission a broker must have been the predominant, procuring cause of the sale. This means that he must have been responsible
for causing a series of events which, without a break in their continuity,
resulted in completing a sale. If the services of a broker are the predominant procuring cause of the sale, then he is entitled to his commission even if the seller completes the sale directly with the buyer.39

The supporting cases for the model jury instruction include Shalimar
Development, Inc. v. FDIC,40 which cited a dispositive break in the continuity of offering properties for sale to the prospective purchaser, and cases
such as Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss,41 and Arents v. Casselman &
Co.,42 in which the court recognized both the many variables that arise in
brokerage commission cases, and the need for ultimate disposition by the
fact-finder.
Shalimar is the most recent “procuring cause” case that the Supreme
Court of Virginia has adjudicated.43 Unlike the earlier case of Kuga, the
39

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, No. 43.020; see also Realty Co. of Va., Inc. v.
Burcum, 106 S.E. 375, 378 (Va. 1921) (“Unless Denton’s acts were the ‘procuring cause’
of the ultimate sale then Burcum had the right to sell to Mr. Dick ‘without any compensation to the Realty Company.’”). In Burcum, a husband and wife solicited the Realty
Company in 1917 to show them farms available for sale. Id. at 375. In traveling past one
farm, the Company manager indicated that it was listed for sale with him, but the couple
indicated that it was late and they declined to visit it, preferring to continue on to the
other farm they and the Company Manager had initially agreed to visit. Id. The couple
visited that farm but made no commitment to purchase it. Id. The next day they expressed
to their host over breakfast that they were in the market for a farm. Id. at 377. The host
indicated that the Burcum farm (the farm they had declined to view the day before) was
on the market and the son-in-law of the owner of the farm, who was also at the breakfast
table, offered to take them to view it. Id. In February of 1918 the couple purchased the
Burcum farm. Burcum, 106 S.E. at 378. The Realty Company subsequently brought suit
against the seller to recover a commission on the sale. Id. at 376. The jury declined to
find the Company manager’s comments to the couple to constitute the “procuring cause”
of sale and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Id. at 378; see also Wilson v.
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Va. 1945) (“[T]he expression ‘procuring
cause’ refers to the cause originating a series of events, which, without break in their
continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime object of the employment of the
broker, which is the procurement of a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy the real
estate on the owner’s terms.”).
40
Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 515 S.E.2d 120, 122 (Va. 1999).
41
Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 221–22 (Va. 1912).
42
Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910).
43
Shalimar Dev., Inc., 515 S.E.2d at 124.
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principal issue in Shalimar was not the extent of the broker’s performance,
but whether there was adequate continuity between the agent’s actions and
the ultimate sale of the property.44 In Shalimar, the seller terminated the
brokerage agreement, and all of the seller’s assets transferred to a new
owner.45 The new owner then sold at a substantially reduced price.46 Under these circumstances, the court decided that there had been a clean and
distant break; consequently, the broker was not due a commission.47
As the cases of Shalimar, Paschall & Gresham, Arents, and also Ford
v. Gibson and Clarke v. Cosby, discussed infra, indicate: “Whether a broker is the procuring cause of a sale of property listed with him is usually a
question of fact” for the jury.48
IV. THE DEFENSE OF ABANDONMENT: ALSO A QUESTION FOR THE JURY
Defendants frequently raise the defense of abandonment when sued by
agents demanding commissions.49 In such cases, defendants argue that the
agent abandoned his or her obligation to market the properties, and thus is
not entitled to a commission.50 As acknowledged infra, the cases of Ford
v. Gibson51 and Clarke v. Cosby52 evidence that a seller who abandons his
efforts to sell property is not entitled to a commission. But that is not the
only point of law to be taken from this pair of cases. They each also make
clear that whether an agent abandons his attempts to secure a sale is a

44

Id.
Id. at 122.
46
Id.
47
Cf. Clarke v. Cosby, 153 S.E. 727, 728–29 (Va. 1930) (stating misunderstandings
between the parties caused an end to the relationship before plaintiff had a contract with
the buyer).
48
Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Va. 1950) (“Whether a broker is the procuring
cause of a sale of property listed with him is usually a question of fact.”) (citing Rosenfield v. Wall, 109 A. 409, 410 (Conn. 1920)); Wilson v. Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35
S.E.2d 737, 739 (Va. 1945) (“Whether a broker is the procuring cause of a sale of property listed with him is usually a question of fact.”); Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730 (“When a real
estate broker is the procuring cause of the sale is a question of considerable difficulty; in
the main, it is a question of fact.”); Shea Realty Corp. v. Page, 69 S.E. 327, 328 (Va.
1910) (“[W]hether or not the agent or broker was the procuring cause of the sale is a
question for the jury.”).
49
See Blankenship v. Childress, 31 S.E.2d 302, 303 (Va. 1944).
50
Id. at 305.
51
Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 870.
52
Clarke, 153 S.E. at 731.
45
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question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder, and not for determination by the court on demurrer or summary judgment.53
In Ford, a broker brought a potential buyer to view the seller’s farm,
but no purchase was consummated.54 After the twelve-month listing
agreement had expired by its terms, the same potential buyer inquired
eight months later, without revealing that he had previously seen the farm
with the agent, and asked the seller “whether the property was still in the
real estate agents’ hands and [the seller] said it was not.”55 The seller then
sold to the buyer.56 When the broker sued to recover a commission, the
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the jury’s conclusion that no listing
agreement was in force requiring a commission to be paid, affirming that,
“on the evidence the jury had a right to find that the plaintiffs were not the
procuring cause of the sale,” and that the agent was not entitled to a commission.57
Like Ford, Clarke involved a broker who unsuccessfully brought suit
against a party for a real estate commission.58 In Clarke, two real estate
brokers, Cosby and Stratton, brought suit against Clarke, a real estate
auctioneer, for commissions allegedly owed.59 The parties had an arrangement whereby Clarke would pay Cosby and Stratton two percent
commission on all business solicited and secured.60 In an attempt to secure
commissions, the brokers-plaintiffs approached Davie, the owner of a tract
of land, and attempted to persuade him to attend one of Clarke’s sales so
that he could become familiar with him.61 At the time, Davie was not
interested.62 “About two months after this visit,” however, Davie approached an agent of Clarke with a request to examine his property, which
he did.63 Davie testified that he had seen Clarke’s advertisements before
the visit by Cosby and Stratton and had seen the advertisements since.64
53

See Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 870 (“Whether a broker is the procuring cause of a sale of
property listed with him is usually a question of fact.”); Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730 (“When a
real estate broker is the procuring cause of the sale is a question of considerable difficulty; in the main, it is a question of fact.”).
54
See Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 868.
55
Id. at 869.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 870.
58
See Clarke, 153 S.E. at 728.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Clarke, 153 S.E. at 728.
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Shortly thereafter, Cosby and Stratton had a number of disputes with
Clarke regarding commissions for properties they believed they had secured for Clarke.65 “As the result of these misunderstandings, the relations
of the plaintiffs and the defendant were severed before the plaintiffs had
secured any contract with Davie.”66
Not surprisingly, the court concluded that, “the plaintiffs had severed
their connection with Clarke before the Davie contract was entered into
and had previously discontinued all their efforts to secure such a contract
with Davie. Under such circumstances, without more, there [could] be no
recovery of commission.”67 The court thus reversed the jury’s verdict that
a commission was owed to the plaintiffs.68 Here, because “the relations
between the plaintiffs and the defendants had been terminated before the
[sales] contract was made ... and had ceased their efforts to procure it
before it was made,”69 the court decided that “there [could] be no recovery
of commission.”70 Although the court concluded that it “was not a case
which should have been submitted to a jury in order to determine whether
or not the plaintiffs were entitled to commissions,”71 had the parties’ relationship not terminated, the issue of “procuring cause” would have gone to
the jury.
In Clarke, as in Ford, a jury was permitted to make the determination
of whether the facts gave rise to circumstances causing a commission to be
due.72 Unlike Ford, however, though the jury in Clarke concluded the
plaintiffs were entitled to a commission, the Supreme Court of Virginia
disagreed, finding that the case should not have gone to a jury because the
broker’s relationship with the firm had terminated.73 Notwithstanding the
disposition, the Clarke case may still be helpful to agents seeking to recover commissions. Of note is its statement that, “a broker may be found
to have been the procuring cause of the sale where the only act done by
him was to show the property to the purchaser, or even to call attention to
it, the sale being completed by the owner.”74

65

Id.
Id.
67
Id. at 729.
68
Id. at 731.
69
Id. (emphasis added).
70
Clarke, 153 S.E. at 729.
71
Id. at 731.
72
Id. at 728.
73
Id. at 731; Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Va. 1950).
74
Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730.
66
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V. “BAD FAITH” OF SELLERS: AN AID TO “PROCURING CAUSE” AND
ALSO A JURY QUESTION
Just as “a broker must do more than be the procuring cause of sale
with a ready, willing and able buyer”75 by acting in good faith with respect
to his dealings, a seller is likewise obligated to act in good faith in his
dealings with brokers.76 The question of whether acts were conducted in
good faith, like the question of “procuring cause” and the question of
abandonment, is an issue of fact for the jury to decide.77 As Clarke, discussed supra, demonstrates, an agent can recover a commission “in cases
in which there has been a severance of relations by fault of the principal in
bad faith and for the very purpose of avoiding the payment of commissions to a broker who has faithfully served him.”78 Yet Clarke, decided in
1930, was not the first case in Virginia to say as much.79 Earlier, in the
1912 case of Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, the agent introduced the
seller to a purchaser, but the seller undertook to complete the sale himself
without paying a commission.80 In allowing the agent a commission, the
Supreme Court of Virginia expressed in no uncertain terms the injustice
that results when a seller, without paying a commission, negotiates a sale
with a buyer procured by the agent.81
75

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, Civil Scope Note.
Id. at No. 43.060.
77
See Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 224 (Va. 1912) (“The question as
to bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, urged by the defendants, was one of fact, fairly to
be submitted to the jury.”).
78
Clarke, 153 S.E. at 729.
79
See, e.g., Paschall, 75 S.E. at 220.
80
Id. at 224.
81
Id. at 226 (“‘If vendors were permitted ... to employ brokers to look up purchasers,
and call the attention of buyers to property which they desired to sell, limiting them as to
terms of sale, and then, when such purchasers were negotiating, take the matter in their
own hands, avail themselves of the labor, services, and expenses of the broker in bringing
the property into market, and accomplish a sale by an abatement in the price, and yet
refuse to pay the broker anything, the business of a broker would not be worth pursuing.
Gross injustice would be done. Every unfair and illiberal vendor would limit his property
at a price slightly above the market, and make use of the broker to bring it into notice,
and then make his own terms with the buyers, who were in reality procured by the efforts
of the agent.’”) (quoting Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42, 44 (1871)); see also Foltz v. Conrad
Realty Co., 109 S.E. 463, 467 (1921) (“[I]f a broker performs his part of a contract empowering him to sell the lands of a principal, and does all that he is required to do, and
the sale is not consummated by reason of the default of the principal, the broker is entitled to his commissions, as the principal cannot wrongfully interfere with the broker,
and escape liability.”); Robertson’s Ex’r v. Atl. Coast Realty Co., 106 S.E. 521, 529
(1921) (“A principal cannot, after having made a valid contract with an agent for the
76
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Likewise, in Arents v. Casselman & Co.,82 the court found that where a
brokerage agreement was revoked due to the withdrawal of a firm member, and the remaining firm members nevertheless maintained sales efforts
after repeated urging from the seller to market the property, the question
was one for the jury; to wit: had the original contract been renewed or
continued, and, if so, was the seller liable in quantum meruit for the efforts
provided.83
The seller, of course, is by no means the only one with a duty to act in
good faith. The cases of Owen v. Shelton,84 Duncan v. Barbour,85 and
Mitchell v. Hughes86 offer three instances in which brokers were denied
commissions for having engaged in actions that amounted to “bad faith.”
Owen v. Shelton deemed the failure of the agent to inform the seller of a
material letter threatening a lawsuit to constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.87 In Duncan v. Barbour, the broker represented to the seller that
changes were made to a contract rejected by the seller, when in fact most
of the revised contract remained unchanged.88 Mitchell v. Hughes dealt
with an agent who sought a commission after sending the purchaser to
negotiate with the seller without disclosing his representation of the buyer.89 The details of these cases, as follow, are revealing.
In Owen v. Shelton,90 a broker employed by the seller received a letter
and check from the buyer indicating that payment for interest, here as the
result of delay by the buyers, was being paid “under protest to close the
transaction,” and that the buyers “reserve[d] right to demand refund or to
litigate the matter.”91 The broker failed to disclose this information to the
seller he represented, and after the seller was sued, she in turn sued the
broker.92 The court held that the broker’s failure to inform the seller of this
letter constituted breach of fiduciary duty.93
exclusive right to sell, render performance on the part of the agent impossible by making
the sale himself, and then successfully defend an action for breach of the contract by
claiming that the agent might not have made the sale.”).
82
Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910).
83
Id.
84
Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981).
85
Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 265 (Va. 1948).
86
Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 228–29 (Va. 1925).
87
Owen, 277 S.E.2d at 192.
88
Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 265.
89
Mitchell, 130 S.E. at 228–29.
90
Owen, 227 S.E.2d at 192.
91
Id. at 191.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 192.
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In Duncan v. Barbour,94 the broker obtained for his seller a contract
that the seller rejected for failing to meet specific demands.95 In response,
the broker prepared a new contract that changed one item to comport with
the seller’s specific demands, but remained otherwise unchanged.96 The
seller “read the contract hastily,” and was “under the impression that the
broker was getting information to prepare a contract in accordance with
the terms and conditions he had prescribed and had specifically and repeatedly told the broker he desired.”97 The owner testified that he thought
that the second contract contained his specific demands and would be
signed by the buyers.98 Shortly thereafter, following a conversation with
his wife, the seller concluded he did not want to sell the property, phoned
the broker “and revoked the authority of the broker to proceed with the
negotiation of the sale, and told him not to make any other efforts ....”99
Over the next few days the broker unsuccessfully tried to persuade the
owner to change his mind, and at one point “took from his pocket a check
and the second contract which had been signed by [the potential purchasers.]”100 The seller said that ship had sailed, though negotiations continued
between the seller and broker for about a week.101 When it became apparent, however, that the parties would not reach an agreement, the broker
demanded a commission, which the seller refused to pay, and suit followed.102
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
broker’s claim to a commission for two reasons. First, the court concluded
that, under the employment contract between the seller and broker, the
broker was required to procure a written contract in order to obtain a
commission.103 While this point was disputed at trial, the trial court concluded that, on the facts, the language of the parties’ agreement required
the broker to produce a written contract.104 Notably, the court recognized
that under some “contract[s] of employment, the broker is not required to
procure a written contract signed by the purchaser as a condition precedent
to his right to recover commissions; nor does his right to compensation
94

Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Va. 1948).
Id.
96
Id. at 265.
97
Id. at 262.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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depend upon the consummation of sale.”105 Whether the same circumstances would ring true in the case at bar, said the court, was a question for
the jury to decide.106 However, though the plaintiff had the opportunity to
present his case before a jury, he elected in this instance to have the case
adjudicated by the court.107 Secondly, the court denied the broker a commission because he breached his duty of good faith by failing to “disclose
to his principal the vital differences in the terms and conditions of sale
contemplated by the parties.”108 The court concluded that:
This duty was not discharged by simply handing to the owner an unsigned contract and directing his attention to one specific change. It
was his duty to inform his principal of all facts which might influence
his principal in accepting or rejecting the offer. An agent is not entitled
to recover until he has fully performed this duty to his principal.109

Somewhat similarly to Duncan, Mitchell v. Hughes110 concerned an
appeal from a jury verdict awarding a broker a commission that the court
had set aside.111 Mitchell was a broker retained by Hughes to sell a parcel
of land.112 Although Mitchell was unable to find a buyer at Hughes’s desired price, he located a potential purchaser and instructed the purchaser to
contact Hughes without mentioning his involvement.113 After Hughes sold
the property to the purchaser for less than he had sought to obtain from a
sale with the broker’s involvement, Mitchell re-initiated contact with
Hughes, informing him for the first time that he had directed the purchase
to Hughes and was thus seeking a commission.114 Not surprisingly,
Hughes objected, indicating that he would not have sold the land for the
lower price he received had he known an agent and a commission were
involved.115 Upon hearing the case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the jury had disregarded one of the jury instructions, and there-

105

Id.
Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 261.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 265.
109
Id.
110
Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 227 (Va. 1925).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 226.
113
Id. at 226–27.
114
Id. at 227.
115
Id. In a telegraph message, Hughes wrote: “Do not understand Mitchell’s position
in this deal, as option and contract was made direct with you [buyer] and price based on
the understanding that no commission was to be paid.” Id.
106
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fore affirmed the trial judge’s action.116 Thus, in Mitchell, the broker acted
in bad faith by deceiving the seller into thinking that no broker was involved, and then springing from the shadows after closing to inform the
seller that he had sent the purchaser and was thereby due a commission.117
More recently—and on the extreme end of cases not suitable for presentation to a jury—the City of Roanoke Circuit Court, in Gorman, Inc. v.
Trans-World Enterprises,118 granted summary judgment against a broker
who first “admitted that [he] never told defendant” of efforts to sell the
property after the listing agreement expired,119 and second, “testified to a
belief that, if a real estate broker ever had supplied information necessary
to consummate a sale of real estate, then the broker would receive a commission regardless of when the sale took place.”120 When asked “why, if
that be the case, one would include a provision granting a broker a commission for sales consummated within a specific period after the contract’s
termination date ... [his answer was] ‘I don’t know.’”121
Keeping in mind that in all colorable cases “[t]he question as to bad
faith on the part of the plaintiff [is] one of fact, fairly to be submitted to
the jury,”122 it is worth noting that in the three afore-discussed cases of
Owen v. Shelton,123 Duncan v. Barbour,124 and Mitchell v. Hughes,125 the
question of bad faith was, indeed, reserved for decision by the fact-finder.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This short work has touched on some of the most frequently cited
“procuring cause” cases to have been adjudicated by the Supreme Court of
Virginia. Yet it must be remembered that each case concerns a unique set
of facts unlikely to ever be repeated. Consequently, the law in this area is
highly fact-sensitive. It is possible, however, to draw some general observations and conclusions. Perhaps the clearest instruction from the cases is
that an agent is least likely to recover when the agent fails to have a valid
listing agreement outstanding with the seller at the time the property is
sold, or when there is inadequate continuity between the agent’s actions
116

Mitchell, 130 S.E. 227, 229.
Id. at 228–29.
118
Gorman, Inc. v. Trans-World Enters., 28 Va. Cir. 517, 517 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 519.
121
Id.
122
Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 224 (Va. 1912).
123
Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981).
124
Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 265 (Va. 1948).
125
Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 227 (Va. 1925).
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and the ultimate sale of the property; indeed, these two situations are often
six to one, half-a-dozen to another.126 Though it is true that an agent’s
failure to proffer a valid listing agreement to the court may not always
preclude recovery on a quantum meruit basis,127 this would nevertheless
surely result in an uphill battle.128 Ultimately, therefore, though by law an
agent need only procure a “ready, willing and able buyer,” it can be significantly more difficult to prove this assertion than it is to make it.129
As is always the case in commercial transactions, the preferred course
for parties seeking to collect on or defend against a suit for a commission
is to secure legal counsel immediately.130 If litigation should ensue, parties
will be in a better position to have their interests protected if notes of all
conversations and interactions with the relevant parties are documented by
hand with the dates of the events in question denoted.131 Further, all rele126

See, e.g., Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 515 S.E.2d 120, 124 (Va. 1999); Ford v.
Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 869 (Va. 1950); Clarke v. Cosby, 153 S.E. 727, 729 (Va. 1930);
Gorman, Inc. v. Trans-World Enters., 28 Va. Cir. 517, 517 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992) (all cases
where listing agreements had expired, there were questions as to adequate continuity, and
where the court denied commissions).
127
See Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910) (permitting recovery
on a quantum meruit basis); supra note 19. Moreover, where the seller exercised bad faith
and circumvented his realtor to sell property to a person introduced by a realtor, the
Virginia Supreme Court similarly recognized that recovery may occur alternately upon an
express contract or on an implied contract, quantum meruit basis. See Clarke, 153 S.E. at
729 (“Of course we do not mean to say that there can be no recovery in cases in which
there has been a severance of relations by fault of the principal in bad faith and for the
very purpose of avoiding the payment of commissions to a broker who has faithfully
served him.”); Paschall, 75 S.E. at 224; see also Hawthorne v. Hannowell, 115 S.E.2d
889, 893–94 (Va. 1960); Bear v. Parrish, 139 S.E. 488, 489–90 (Va. 1927); Palmer v.
Showalter, 101 S.E. 136, 139–40 (Va. 1919) (offering instances in which sellers acted in
“bad faith,” resulting in awards of commissions to brokers).
128
In Virginia, the statute of limitations on a written agreement or written contract is
five years. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (West 2011). This means that any potential suit
for alleged breach must be filed within five years from the date of the action alleged to
constitute the breach of written agreement or breach of written contract.
129
See, e.g., Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 819 (Va. 1991) (stating the “ready, willing, and able” standard); Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263 (same); JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 20, No. 43.050 (“A purchaser is ready, willing and able to buy if he wants to buy
and if at the time he is produced to the seller he has the ability to obtain any necessary
financing at the closing”).
130
See, e.g., Do You Really Need a Lawyer?, LAWYERS.COM, http://research.lawyers
.com/Do-You-Really-Need-a-Lawyer.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
131
See, e.g., David J. Freedman, Okay, You Think You Might Be Sued. Now What?
Litigation Holds and the World of Electronic Discovery, BARLEY SNYDER BUS. & LITIG.
UPDATE, (June 30, 2008), at 2, http://www.barley.com/publications/article.cfm?Article
_ID=262.
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vant e-mails should be printed, and all documents, letters, and correspondence exchanged in connection with the transaction should be organized,
kept clean, and preserved in a safe environment.132 If these practices are
followed, parties will be in a position of strength to marshal the facts and
frame their argument in the light most favorable to them in the event that
litigation ultimately ensues.

132

See, e.g., id.

